Crowd Arbitration: Blockchain Dispute Resolution

  • Aleksei Gudkov National Research University Higher School of Economics
Keywords: blockchain, dispute resolution, distributed arbitration, social justice, blockchain court, online justice, ODR, crowd arbitration

Abstract

Internet technology makes digital value transactions between anonymous individuals possible, but leaves unanswered the question of how to resolve disputes between unidentified parties. Blockchain dispute resolution platforms provide a response to this problem. In the social dispute resolution systems for blockchain currently in use, pseudo anonymous jurors can resolve disputes between pseudo anonymous parties. This paper presents Kleros as the most illustrative blockchain dispute resolution platform BDRP. To describe the features of the Kleros dispute resolution platform and the qualification of jurors, this research employs an online dispute resolution survey of both the jurors and stakeholders of the Kleros platform. This study raises important questions about key elements of procedural justice in resolution platforms for blockchain disputes. The research underlines the pros and cons of dispute resolution for crowdsourced blockchain and contributes to the further development of online dispute resolution systems. It tests the wisdom of the crowd as the core attribute of the resolution process in crowdsource disputes. Crowdsource mass dispute resolution, coupled with cooperative jurors and blockchain technology, could ensure greater effectiveness and fairness of the dispute resolution process, especially the adjudication of online small claims disputes.

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Author Biography

Aleksei Gudkov, National Research University Higher School of Economics

Associate Professor

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Published
2020-12-17
How to Cite
GudkovA. (2020). Crowd Arbitration: Blockchain Dispute Resolution. Legal Issues in the Digital Age, 3(3), 59-77. https://doi.org/10.17323/2713-2749.2020.3.59.77